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 ABSTRACT 
This study examines the possibility of catch-up of the Chinese steel 
industry, in particular the Shougang Group, with the leading global steel giants. 
Shougang is one of the four steel companies that have been selected by the 
Chinese government to constitute the core of the future Chinese steel industry. 
The contract system at Shougang, which operated from 1979 to 1995, unleashed 
an extraordinary entrepreneurial energy in the formerly traditional state-run steel 
plant. In the post-contract system, Shougang’s range of decision-making 
independence in respect to the purchase of inputs, its production structure and 
product marketing has increased substantially compared to the contract system, 
when the government still controlled many of the key decisions. As a result of 
institutional constraint, the low value-added steel products dominate Shougang’s 
portfolio. To challenge the established giants in the steel industry, Shougang has 
to divest the loss-making non-core businesses, slowly downsize employment in 
the core business, raise capital on the stock market and generates the resources for 
continued upgrading of its steel technology and diversifying its product portfolio. 
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1 Introduction 
The possibility for large Chinese firms to catch up with leading global 
firms is very limited in high technology sectors, such as aerospace or information 
technology (IT) hardware. It is also quite limited in branded consumer goods with 
established global consumption habits. However, it is argued that there are much 
greater possibilities for large firms in less developed countries (LDCs) to catch up 
in industries with lower levels of technology, such as steel. This paper examines 
this issue in relation to a single case, Shougang Group (hereinafter called 
Shougang). 
China’s rise has, arguably, been the most important change in the global 
steel industry in the last two decades. Alongside explosive growth of demand and 
output, there have occurred important institutional changes in the Chinese steel 
industry. China intends to build four globally competitive giant steel corporations. 
Shougang, the subject of this paper, is one of these. Analysis of Shougang has 
focused almost exclusively on the expanded autonomy given to Shougang as the 
explanation of its exceptional growth under the contract system, e.g. Steinfeld 
(1998:167). This paper has argued that a relatively high degree of autonomy 
compared to other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is not a sufficient explanation. 
Many other enterprises adopted the contract system, but few were as successful as 
Shougang. As a global steel-maker, the experience of Shougang and its ability to 
catch-up with leading global steel giants have important implications for the 
development of steel industry. 
The changing patterns of the global and Chinese iron and steel industries 
are reviewed in section 2 briefly. Section 3 analyses Shougang under the contract 
system, while section 4 analyses the change in direction that Shougang has 
pursued since the retirement of Zhou Guanwu and the termination of the contract 
system. Section 5 evaluates the prospect of Shougang and section 6 concludes this 
paper’s findings. 
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2 The Iron & Steel Industry 
Steel is a highly cyclical industry. World-wide steel output grew from 135 
million tons in 1947 to a new record high level of 795 million tons in 1997, before 
declining to 778 million tons in 1998 (IISI, 1999). The outlook for the industry is 
not optimistic as the Iron and Steel Statistics Bureau estimates that an excess 
capacity of more than 25% of the world production capacity (or at least 250 
million tons) will continue depress the steel price (FT, 23 October 1998:23). 
Steel was regarded as a key strategic sector. It received a great deal of 
government support, and in most of Europe was predominantly state-owned, with 
over one-half of steel output in the 1980s being produced by SOEs (Cockerill, 
1974). A wave of privatisation had transformed the institutional background of the 
steel industry in Europe. By 1998, the proportion of steel produced in SOEs had 
fallen to under 5% (MSDW, 1998). Massive downsizing of employment was a 
major reflection of the change in management practices accompanying 
privatisation. In Europe, employment in the steel industry fell from 998,000 in 
1974 to 287,000 in 1998, while output per worker increased from 190 tons/worker 
to 557 tons/worker respectively (IISI, 1999). Moreover, large-scale cross-country 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), such as the £4.3 billion merger between British 
Steel and Koninklijke Hoogovens, shift the competitive landscape from “national 
champions” to the truly multinational steel companies (FT, 3 & 8 June 1998). 
In China, the Ministry of Metallurgy controlled the overall development 
(including steel prices and product mix) of the steel industry until the late 1980s. 
The government continued to fix “guidance” prices for the main steel products, 
even it freed all steel prices in 1994. In 1997, the Ministry of Metallurgy Industry 
(MMI) was abolished, and replaced by the State Bureau of Metallurgical Industry 
(SBMI). With the exception of Shougang (which reports directly to the Beijing 
municipal government), the other largest Chinese steel-makers, such as Anshan 
Iron and Steel (Angang), Baoshan Iron and Steel (Baogang or Baosteel) and 
Wuhan Iron and Steel (Wugang), all report directly to the SBMI. 
China’s steel output tripled from 37 million tons in 1980 to 114.3 million 
tons in 1998. China rose from the world’s fifth largest steel maker in 1980 to 
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become the number one producer in 1996, accounting for 14% of total world 
production. Due to the long gestation period for building a large integrated steel 
plant, many small steel plants were established to facilitate the excess demand 
since the 1980s. There were around 1,600 iron and steel enterprises “within the 
system”. Of these, only 28 of them with annual output of one million tons or 
higher. Another 1,500-odd plants were truly small-scale, with annual output below 
0.5 million tons (ISIC, 1997; CMISI, 1998; SBMI, 1998; IISI, 1999). These 
typically had low technical efficiency, used old techniques and were often highly 
polluting. 
Large improvements have taken place in Chinese steel industry technology 
since the 1970s. The ratio of steel made by continuous-casting increased from just 
4% in 1975 to 68% in 1998. The share of open-hearth production fell from 28% in 
1984 to 5% in 1998, the share of converters rose from 51% to 61%, and the share 
of electric arc furnaces rose from 9% to 20%, respectively (CMISI, 1997; IISI, 
1999). The improvements in steel industry technology are reflected in the fall in 
energy consumption per unit of steel produced: specific energy consumed per ton 
fell from 2.04 tons in 1980 to 1.39 tons in 1996 (ISIC, 1997:91). 
Under the wider industrial policy of “grasping the large and letting go of 
the small” (zhua da, fang xiao), the Chinese government has determined to 
develop the four leading steel enterprises – Baogang, Shougang, Angang, and 
Wugang – into world-class companies. Each of them had an annual output of over 
six million tons in 1997, and account for 28% of China’s total steel output. Their 
aggregate pre-tax profits in 1996 amounted to 4.4 billion yuan, equal to the total 
profits for the entire Chinese steel industry (CMISI, 1998). However, they were 
still not in the front ranks of the world’s steel producers. China’s highest ranking 
steel enterprise in 1998 was Baogang, which ranked thirteenth. Angang ranked 
twenty and Shougang twenty-one (IISI, 1999). 
3 Shougang under the Contract System 
Shougang was run by a former People’s Liberalisation Army (PLA) 
commander and senior figure in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Zhou 
 3 
   
Guanwu, until 1995.1 A 15-year contract (1981-1995) was struck with the Beijing 
city government, the direct administrative superior of Shougang. The contract 
system adopted at Shougang consisted of four elements: 
• Profits handed-over to the state were to increase by 7.2% annually, based on 
the profit submitted in 1981. 
• Of the retained profit, 60% was to be used as development funds, 20% as 
collective welfare funds, and 20% as bonuses for the employees: this was the 
6:2:2 system.  
• No financial assistance from the state. 
• The size of the wage-bill was linked to the enterprise’s profits: for every 1% 
increase in profits there was to be a 0.8% rise in the payroll.  
The contract system hardened the immediate financial pressure on 
Shougang. Each year, Shougang paid a state infrastructure tax, amounting to 15% 
of retained profits (Table 1). Being proportionate to the enterprise’s retained 
profits, these payments rose at a much faster rate than did the contracted profits 
hand-over. 
[PLACED TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3.1 Autonomy within constraints 
Although there was no official representative on the Board of Directors of 
Shougang, the Party Secretary, Factory Manager, General Manager, their deputies 
and other comparable positions were appointed by the government. It may be 
more accurate to describe the “Board of Directors” (lishihui) as the “management 
team” or the executive directors. Shougang’s real “Board of Directors” was the 
Beijing government, to whom the “preferred dividend” (in forms of profits hand-
over) was paid. 
Government control over Shougang’s production structure gradually 
atrophied, only finally disappearing in the late 1990s. Subsequently, Shougang 
was, and still is, China’s leading producer mainly at the lower value-added of steel 
products, e.g. small section steel and wire rods (Table 2). The competition was 
                                                 
1 Some of the ideas in section 4 is elaborated in greater length in Nolan (1998). 
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strongest from emerging small-scale producers. In 1997, local and “non-system” 
(i.e. outside the planning framework) plants accounted for 69% of output of small 
section steel and 53% of the output of wire rods. These products benefited much 
less from economies of scale, often required less complex, lumpy equipment, and 
needed less attention to product quality.  
[PLACED TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The government still set the wage structure and the rights to make workers 
redundant. Unlike Western steel firms, Shougang was forced to look towards 
growth rather than redundancy as the main path to solving the problem of surplus 
employees. In 1996, average annual wages (including bonuses and subsidies) in 
Chinese keypoint steel plants stood at 10,507 yuan, compared to 10,136 yuan at 
Shougang, 10,230 yuan at Angang and 12,232 yuan at Wugang (Table 3). 
Baogang alone among the large steel plants had substantially higher average 
wages at 25,000 yuan (ISIC, 1997:122). 
[PLACED TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
3.2 Modernisation 
Shougang’s output of crude steel rose from 1.8 million tons in 1978 to 8.3 
million tons in 1994, around 10% per annum. By 1996, it was the top three 
China’s largest steel producer (CMISI, 1998). 
Shougang’s approach to modernisation was: “Shougang first, China 
second, imports third”. It make careful comparisons of the costs of repair and 
replacement, and not hesitate to combine them if this reduced costs and speeded 
up improvement with minimum interruption to production. Foreign equipment 
was only bought if it was suitable, and was combined as far as possible with 
Shougang’s own technology. Shougang intentionally purchased equipment that 
was in good condition but was not highly automated, and itself automated the 
equipment. From 1980 to 1990, Shougang spent 4.27 billion yuan for technical 
renovation and capital construction on 108 key projects, all of them earned 
sufficient profits to recoup their investment outlays within two years (CDBW, 28 
July 1991:4; Li, et al., 1992:226). The returns per yuan of fixed investment at 
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Shougang were the highest of the eight largest steel-makers in China (RCMED, 
1992:143). 
By 1997, almost all the steel at Shougang was produced with oxygen 
converters, and 78% of its steel products was produced by the continuous-casting 
method. The share of electric furnaces at Shougang (50%) was high compared to 
other large SOEs. Electric furnaces are typically necessary for the production of 
high quality alloy steel. By 1997, Shougang produced 312,000 tons of alloy steel, 
the largest producer of such steel product in China. Its output per worker was 50% 
above that at old integrated steel plants such as Panzihua, Benxi and Angang 
(CMISI, 1998). 
3.3 Merger, diversification, transnationalisation 
Shougang was in the vanguard of M&As within China, most were 
administrative co-ordinated. Shougang’s 14 second-tier companies (erji gongsi) 
were tightly managed by Shougang’s headquarters, operating under a strict 
contract system. By the early 1990s, it owned 157 large and medium-sized plants 
and 65 joint ventures (JVs). It had risen to be the fourth largest company in China 
in terms of total sales value (DRC, 1993:2-3). Shougang also rapidly expanded its 
international operations. By 1994, Shougang had 26 overseas enterprises and 
offices scattered in 13 countries and regions including America, Europe, Southeast 
Asia, the Middle East and the former USSR (SG, 1995). 
Much of Shougang’s diversification and transnationalisation in the later 
phase of the contract system was related to the new 10 million-ton plant, Qilu Iron 
and Steel in Shandong. 
• Machine-building capability: After the mergers of 20 large machinery 
enterprises and 13 military factories in 1988, the Shougang Heavy Machinery 
Corporation (with 60,000 workers) was established to design and build 
machinery to meet the urgent metallurgical and mining needs generated by 
Shougang’s growth (SG, 1995:8; 1998:2).2 
                                                 
2 Unlike other enterprises that Shougang had acquired, it was not allowed to return the 13 military 
enterprises to their previous owners, even though they were losing heavily and unable to fulfil the 
contracts (SG, 1998:38-39). 
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• Construction capacity: By 1992, Shougang had ten construction companies, 
comprising the Shougang Construction Corporation, with a total of 80,000 
employees. They were engaged in the construction, installation and 
commissioning of blast furnaces, steel-making factories and power stations, 
etc. 
• Design and electronic control capability: Shougang’s technical capability 
was greatly extended after it acquired 70% of the Mesta Engineering 
Company in Pittsburgh for US$3.4 million in 1988. By 1994, Shougang 
Electronics Corporation employed 3,000 technicians and professionals 
experienced in electronics design, programming, engineering and 
manufacturing. 
• Mining capability: By the 1990s, Qian’an had 26,000 employees. In 1992, 
Shougang purchased the Hierro iron mine in Peru for US$120 million, 
intended to guarantee the supply of raw material for Qilu (Liu et al., 1994). 
• Shipping capability: The high price of freight – accounted for up to one-half 
of the total purchase price of second-hand equipment – led Shougang to set up 
a shipping JV with Hong Kong Hongda Shipping Company. By 1994, it had a 
total transportation capacity of 2.4 million tons. 
• Export capability: By 1993, Shougang controlled seven listed companies in 
Hong Kong, with US$1.54 billion worth of assets (CDBW, 20 February 
1994:2). In 1995, Shougang Southeast Asia Holdings was registered in 
Singapore to further facilitate steel exports in Southeast Asia. 
3.4 Military-style organisation 
Renovation of any single substantial segment of Shougang had profound 
implication in other parts of the enterprise. Limited funds and constraints of space 
in Beijing meant that Shougang had to rely heavily on upgrading existing 
facilities, impelled them to carry out technological transformation as quickly as 
possible. Time spent in renovation meant income foregone from having segments 
of the plant shut down. It was from this income that the resources for further 
renovation came. In this sense, the contract system imposed the hardest of budget 
constraints upon Shougang.  
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Each of the major technological renovations was treated as a battle, with 
the Corporation organised like an army.3 From 1992 to 1995 alone, Shougang 
carried out more than ten large technological renovation projects. The renovation 
of the No. 2 Blast Furnace involved the investment of 130 million yuan in 
dismantling 13,000 tons of material and installing 25,000 tons of material. Over 
7,000 workers were assigned to work day and night in a 100m3 area. It was 
completed within 55 days rather than the 104 days that originally scheduled (BR, 
13-19 January 1992:16). 
4 Shougang since the Contract System 
After 1995, Shougang continued to organise financial data around “hand-
overs” and retained profits (Table 1). The Beijing government directly reimburses 
Shougang all of its profits tax, which amounted to around 70 million yuan in 1997 
(on pre-tax profits of 351 million yuan). However, Shougang has to pay 10% of its 
total sales revenue as turnover tax to the Beijing government (around 1.7 billion 
yuan in 1996 and 1.8 billion yuan in 1997), which is much higher than the profits 
tax reimbursement, and several times higher than the total retained profits, which 
were officially recorded as only 180-200 million yuan in 1995 and 1996.4 It 
appears that the turnover tax has replaced the hand-overs of the contract system as 
the “preferred dividend” to the sole shareholder, the Beijing City government. 
A number of businesses have been sold or substantially restructured and a 
number of expansion plans have been dropped since 1995. Much of the change 
stemmed from the failure of Shougang to obtain approval from the central 
government to expand steel production outside Beijing. e.g. the Qilu and Liuzhou 
projects have been dropped. After restructuring, the Heavy Machinery 
Corporation still have 50,000 employees, mainly in former military enterprises. 
Shougang’s shipping fleet has been placed into a JV with P&O (SG, 1998:5-14). 
In June 1998, a reassessment of Shougang’s strategy recognised that the 
Corporation’s development was limited by the poor products mix, low 
                                                 
3 The four necessary conditions for successful military-style organisation are a unified command 
system, strict discipline, full mobilisation and a strong supporting service. 
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profitability of second-tier companies, a heavy debt burden, and a large amount of 
surplus workers. Subsequently, five development strategies were outlined by the 
Shougang’s Board of Directors. 
4.1 Establishment of a modern management system 
After 1995, Shougang began slowly to transform itself toward a limited 
company. From 1998 onward, this transformation process will be accelerated. The 
following are the main features of this transformation (Ibid.:5-32): 
[PLACED FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
• Shougang Corporation (the core company) was renamed as Beijing Shougang 
(Group) Company Limited, and was re-registered (Figure 1). The Beijing 
government designated Beijing Shougang (Group) Company Limited as the 
core company with the authority to enforce its shareholder’s rights upon 
second-tier companies within the Shougang Group. 
• Shougang will separate off seven production units to form the Beijing 
Shougang Stock Holding Company Limited and listed as an A-share company 
in the Chinese stock market. Other second-tier companies will be restructured 
into either stock-holding limited companies or limited companies. 
• The second-tier companies have been turned into “legal persons”, with all the 
associated rights and responsibilities. Economic transactions between the core 
and second-tier companies (or among second-tier companies) must be based at 
market prices. 
• A hierarchical managerial system with the Board of Directors, Managers and a 
Monitoring Committee in the core and second-tier companies has been 
established (Figure 1). 
• Shougang is establishing throughout the Group a system of professional 
recruitment. Employees must undertake routine tests and those failed must 
receive re-training or accept re-assignment to subsidiaries. Each individual 
constituent company within the Group has the right to establish its own 
remuneration system (tied to productivity). 
                                                                                                                                      
4 The “tax” payments from Shougang still account for around one-fifth of Beijing’s total revenues 
generated from industry. 
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4.2 Integrated development of IT and electronic industries 
By 2000, Shougang aims to develop integrated IT and electronics 
industries, and increase the sector’s revenues from 1.6 billion yuan to 3.2 billion 
yuan. To achieve this goal, Shougang has established the Shougang High 
Technology Development Office to co-ordinate the development of this branch of 
the Group. In addition, Shougang will inject another one billion yuan to import 
technology through establishing Sino-foreign JVs, to cultivate domestic R&D 
capability, and to accelerate the transformation of technological advances into 
commercially applicable products (Ibid.:7-9). 
Shougang NEC is the centrepiece in the development of Shougang’s 
electronics capability. Shougang and NEC (Japan) together will invest a further 
US$150 million in the JV that established in 1990. This will raise the 
technological manufacturing capability to 0.35 micrometers, increase the 
production capacity of integrated circuits to 120 million units, and production 
capacity of chips to 96,000 units. This technological advancement will assist the 
development of the newly established robots manufacturing firm (“Motorman” 
Robotics), a Sino-Japanese JV started in 1997. Shougang hopes these two major 
projects can act as the catalyst for the development of an integrated IT and 
electronics industry and increases the share of non-steel industry to account for 
more than 50% of total Group revenues (Ibid.:6-8; SCMP, 9 March 1999). 
4.3 Development of the tertiary sector 
In the absence of a social safety net, Shougang cannot radically downsize 
employment as it would create a severe social problem in Beijing. The alternative 
strategy has been to re-assign redundant employees to the newly-developed real 
estate and service sectors (SG, 1998:34). 
Shougang Real Estates Stock Holding Company has been established to 
expand Shougang’s real estate activities. Shougang has several advantages in 
developing its real estate business. It owns about two million m2 of property in the 
centre of Beijing. It is China’s largest manufacturer of construction steel products. 
It has a huge construction company employing around 50,000 people. Shougang 
 10 
   
Real Estates Stock Holding Company has a total targeted capital of 10 billion 
yuan. Shougang’s aim is that the Company generate revenues of 600 million yuan 
by the year 2000. Other small-scale welfare units within the Group will be 
allowed to merge, to form joint-stock companies, to contract out their services, to 
re-organise and even to go bankrupt. The ultimate goal is to transform them all 
into financially self-sufficient companies (Ibid.:9-31). 
4.4 Restructuring and technological upgrading of steel business 
The Beijing City government has set a limit of eight million tons steel-
making capacity at Shougang, in line with its goal of changing the production 
structure of Beijing towards knowledge-based, high value-added products with 
new and high technologies (Luo, 1998). Accordingly, Shougang’s main objectives 
in iron and steel are to improve product quality, increase the share of high value-
added products, and improve product variety. The development strategy of the 
Shougang Special Steel Corporation will be integrated with that of the other steel 
mills and will cease to duplicate the production lines. Shougang has identified 
light construction steel as a key route to enhance its capabilities in high value-
added steels. 
Shougang plans to improve the application of computers to automate the 
production process, improve production efficiency and reduce the emission of 
pollutants. A 2,160 mm hot-rolled mill will soon be installed, significantly 
enhancing Shougang’s product mix. To further enhance the role of high value-
added products, steel products are increasingly to be manufactured into semi-
finished or finished form, according to the customers’ specifications. The general 
strategy is to improve the whole production and marketing processes from the 
selection and preparation of iron ores to the distribution and after-sales services 
(SG, 1998:6-12). 
4.5 Further development in overseas businesses  
By 1996, Shougang had become one of the leading transnational 
corporations (TNCs) from LDCs, ranked twenty-first by value of overseas assets. 
Its foreign employment amounted to only 1,600, comprising less than 1% of its 
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total employment. However, its overseas assets were valued at US$1.6 billion, 
amounting to 24% of the Group’s total assets and its foreign sales amounted to 
US$1.03 billion, amounting to 24% of its total revenue. 
Through China Shougang International Trading and Engineering 
Corporation (CSITEC), Shougang aims to further develop the export markets and 
generate more revenues in Southeast Asia, South America and Africa. To enhance 
its role in raising foreign capital to restructure and renovate the core and second-
tier companies in China, Shougang aims to substantially reduce the debt of 
Shougang Holdings (Hong Kong) from HK$1.17 billion to HK$300 million in 
1998.5 It intends to inject high quality assets from the mainland into the Hong 
Kong vehicle. 
The Hierro Iron Ore Mine in Peru is yielding profits. Since completing the 
purchase, Shougang has invested US$150 million to process the iron ore at the 
mine so that it meets pollution regulations in the (developed countries) DCs. It has 
also invested in pelletising facilities. Iron ore pellets are especially in high demand 
because they can be used in the process of making steel through direct reduced 
iron. The upgrading of product quality has enabled the mine to export iron ore to a 
wide range of countries, including the US, Japan (Nippon Steel), South Korea 
(Posco). The mine made annual pre-tax profits of US$3 million since 1997. It is 
planned to restructure the Hierro mine and float the company on the US and 
Canadian stock markets. 
5 The Prospect of Shougang 
It is possible that large indigenous integrated steel firms in LDCs will be 
able to catch-up with and even overtake those in the DCs by following the path of 
Nippon Steel (Japan) and Posco (South Korea). The rationales are as follows: 
• For basic steel-making processes, the technology is embodied in equipment 
that can be purchased relatively easily and operated effectively in a relatively 
short time (Amsden, 1989). 
                                                 
5 Its debt-asset ratio stood at 32.5% in 1997. 
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• If local steel firms in LDCs are able to meet fast growing local demand, they 
may be able to generate sufficient revenues to reinvest to benefit from 
economies of scale, modernise production facilities and begin to generate 
technical progress. 
• China processes rich iron ore and coal resources (low value-to-weight ratios). 
• The low labour costs (US$0.5/hour) more than compensate for the lower level 
of labour productivity in China, e.g. labour costs amount to less than 10% of 
total costs, while it rise to 26-27% in the US and Europe (MSDW, 1998). 
Before catching-up their DCs’ counterparts, Shougang has to overcome 
three major obstacles: mismatch of demand and supply, welfare legacy, and 
capital constraints and divestment. 
5.1 Mismatch of demand & supply 
Despite the large investment, China’s steel technology still lags behind the 
world’s leading producers in important respects. For example, it is estimated that 
the technologies used in top-blown oxygen converters and continuous-casting in 
China is 15-20 years behind that of South Korea, Japan and Europe. The 
comprehensive energy consumption in the Chinese steel industry is 30-40% 
higher than in that of their counterparts in DCs, which contributes to high level of 
pollution (SBMI, 1998:5). In Shougang, electric furnace only accounted for a 
merely 5% of its total crude steel output in 1998, which was well behind the 
industrial leaders in the US (45%) and South Korea (40%). This explains why 
cheap steel still imported at a record-breaking rate as Chinese steel-makers are 
unable to produce the right quality of high-value added steel, such as hot-rolled 
steel, cold-rolled sheet and stainless steel, demanded by the massive infrastructure 
project. In 1996, imports accounted for 50% of China’s consumption of car sheets, 
81% of stainless sheet, and 87% of domestic appliance sheet (SBMI, 1998). In the 
first-quarter of 1999, the steel import rose 42% to 3.58 million tons while the steel 
export slumped 18% year-on-year to 610,000 tons (SCMP, 31 May 1999).6 In 
1996, the proportion of steel products judged to be at the level of “advanced world 
                                                 
6 This figure excludes an unknown amount of steel being smuggling into China. 
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standards” stood at 99% at Baogang, 81% at Wugang, 61% at Angang and just 
29% at Shougang (ISIC, 1997:124-138).  
Although Shougang’s output grew rapidly, a large part of the growth was 
in low value-added, low quality steel, such as construction steel. In the late 1990s, 
high quality steel still accounted for only 15% of its total output. In 1997, 
Shougang’s steel sold for the equivalent of US$275/ton, much lower than 
US$700/ton for British Steel and Usinor’s products. Shougang’s sales value in 
1997 amounted to just US$2.2 billion, compared with US$11 billion for British 
Steel, US$12 billion for Usinor and US$25 billion for Nippon Steel. All four of 
China’s top producers together, namely Shougang, Angang, Baogang and 
Wugang, had a sales revenue of just US$9 billion, still well below that of the main 
European and East Asian producers, reflecting, to a considerable degree their high 
proportion of low quality, low value-added products. Shougang found it hard to 
extricate itself from a vicious circle. The fact that it mainly produced low quality 
steel meant that it was mainly in competition with small-scale local producers 
contesting with them for local markets. The low value-added produced low profit 
margins, which in turn limited Shougang’s capacity to modernise through 
investment in R&D and new products. Assuming Shougang is able to increase its 
productivity dramatically to 380 tons/man/year by 2000, it is still well behind the 
industrial leaders of Nippon Steel (949 tons/man/year) and Posco (966 
tons/man/year) (Table 3). Even assuming Shougang is able to achieve its aim to 
raise the share of high value-added steel products from a mere 12% in 1997, to 
30% in 2005, and over 60% in 2010, Shougang cannot increase its market share 
on high value-added steel products shortly (SG, 1998:6-12). 
5.2 Welfare legacy 
With the exception of Baogang, China’s steel industry is vastly over-
manned by world standards.7 A single large steel plant employs around 200,000 
people, as many as the whole steel industry of Europe or the US (Table 3). 
Employment at the world’s leading steel firms, Nippon Steel and Posco, which 
produce more than three times the annual steel output of Angang or Shougang, is 
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only 20,000-30,000. The Chinese government has announced plans to reduce 
employment in the sector by 25%, or around 700,000, by the year 2000 (FT, 25 
November 1997). Shougang estimates that roughly one-third of its total 
employees are redundant (SG, 1998:34). In 1998, Shougang retired and laid off 
17,700 workers. Another 15,000 workers are expected to follow the similar fate in 
1999 (SCMP, 9 March 1999). That still left 185,000 workers in its pay-rolls. In 
fact, remuneration is so low that the impact of downsizing on the competitiveness 
of China’s large steel plants will be far less than was the case in DCs, or even in 
Brazil, where hourly wage rates are around thirty times as high as in China 
(MSDW, 1998). 
As the social problems faced in downsizing are especially acute in China, 
this explains why the development of non-core businesses is an important path to 
downsizing the steel sector.8 Shougang is following similar strategy by established 
the Shougang Service Company. Already, 400,000 Shougang employees and their 
families live in housing owned by Shougang. Over the next three years, Shougang 
will build another two million m2 of housing. Gradual commercialisation of the 
management of this huge stock of property will generate 270 million yuan of 
revenues by the year 2000. In reality, it can be argued that there is only a transfer 
of the economic burden of the welfare legacy to the “spin-off” subsidiaries so 
that the balance sheet of the steel sector looks healthier. The surplus workers are 
still existed in the macro economy. Whether Shouguan can reach its ultimate goal 
to transform all its subsidiaries into financially self-sufficient companies is 
questionable. The critical issue is will Shougang have the time and capital to 
sustain the transitional period?  
5.3 Capital constraints & divestment 
The political and social constraints on making massive downsizing in 
employment have pushed Shougang towards the path of diversification. The 
process has been stimulated by the low profit margins and great market cycles in 
the steel industry. Nonetheless, there are costs attached to extensive downstream 
                                                                                                                                      
7 Baogang began production in 1982 and have a much lower manning level (34,000 people) than 
other major plants (Table 3). Consequently, it has much lower welfare costs. 
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and service sector diversification. A large integrated steel company has only 
limited business skills in such activities. It may be unable to generate economies 
of scale, encounter fierce competition and the danger of diverting investment 
funds away from the core business. It is striking that the most successful steel 
company in the world, Posco, under state ownership has studiously avoided the 
path of conglomerate diversification so characteristic of the chaebol business 
structure of the rest of Korea. Extensive diversification into downstream 
consumer goods and services is taking Shougang along the path of the chaebols 
rather than Posco. 
Shougang had borrowed heavily to finance the ambitious diversification 
programme in the early 1990s. In 1996, Shougang’s total debt was 18.4 billion 
yuan, of which 79% was short-term. The loss-making second-tier company is 
another source to drain valuable capital from Shougang. In 1997, there was a total 
of 71 second-tier companies, of which 25 were loss-makers, with losses totalling 
830 million yuan. The core iron and steel company made a profit of 958 million 
yuan, but the Shougang Special Steel Corporation lost 141 million yuan, mining 
operations lost 297 million yuan and the other non-steel operation lost another 393 
million yuan, which offset 87% of the profits generated from the core company. 
Shougang’s international operations made a profit of 212 million yuan (SG, 
1998:3-6). Thus, the total Group profit of 351 million yuan disguised a very 
different performance between the separate branches of the Group. 
Through the managerial and other complementary reforms, Shougang aims 
to reduce losses by 80% by 2000, and to eliminate loss-makers entirely by 2005 
(Ibid.:6). Reports of Shougang unable to secure bank loans to serve its debts and 
20% of the 220,000 strong workers have not been paid from two to six months in 
1999 suggests that Shougang may experience difficulties on its cash liquidity (FT, 
3 April 1999:4). To combat the oversupply, Shougang plans to reduce steel output 
by 800,000 tons (about 10%) in 1999 (SCMP, 13 February 1999). Obviously, 
restructuring with divestment is urgently needed to restore the balance sheet with 
productive assets. The divestment is more urgently on the non-core loss-making 
businesses, including the “spin-off” businesses from the welfare legacy and the 
                                                                                                                                      
8 The Chinese large SOE is a complete society, with comprehensive social responsibilities towards 
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heavily over-manned machinery businesses taken over from the PLA. Due to the 
sensitive economic and political implications of large-scale redundancy that may 
resulted, it is this part of the business in Shougang Group proven to be the most 
difficult to divest. 
6 Conclusions 
The contract system at Shougang, which operated from 1979 to 1995, 
unleashed an extraordinary entrepreneurial energy in the formerly traditional 
state-run steel plant. Most large-scale technological up-grading in Shougang was 
conducted in the early 1990s, which coincided with a property speculation boom 
in which most Chinese firms participated, suggested that entrepreneurs at 
Shougang work for growth within their industry rather than for short-term profit 
maximisation.  
A central proposition of the “transition orthodoxy” about how to transform 
communist economies was that the pre-reform communist institutions should be 
destroyed. Their interests were thought to be irreconcilable with the market 
economy. Their members were thought to be incapable of turning towards the 
market and competitive behaviour. The experience of Shougang shows that the 
CCP and the PLA possessed a rich legacy of organisational and motivational 
skills. Even old Party cadres and army officers, such as Zhou Guanwu, possessed 
the capability to make the transition to the market economy, if given the correct 
incentive structure. Indeed, their lifetime experience of thinking strategically and 
mobilising people in complex institutions was a valuable skill for the construction 
of an effective market-oriented business organisation. In the transition to a 
market-oriented economy, the military style of traditional communist culture is a 
potentially valuable institutional force to assist the struggle to modernise and do 
battle in the marketplace.9 It can help to avoid the institutional problems of the 
typical large Western firm, such as principle/agent struggle, free-riding and 
                                                                                                                                      
both the employees and their families, e.g. schools, hospitals, and housing, etc. 
9 In contrast to the traditional theory of consumer economics and profit maximisation, Thurow 
(1991:51) has argued that in Japan during its rise to global power in the 1980s, competition was 
treated as warfare rather than a rational process of profit maximisation. Janelli’s (1993:226) 
detailed account of a large Korean firm speaks of a “military style of life [that] pervaded the 
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bureaucratic hierarchy, which arise because the employees are motivated 
primarily by individual economic interests. Shougang’s army-style of 
organisation, aiming not for profit maximisation but for victory in the battles of 
technical modernisation and growth may look irrational but nonetheless effective 
during the contract system period. Shougang challenged not only the traditional 
theory of the firm, but also the liberal neo-classical ideology which was battling 
for supremacy in China. 
The contract system was, however, a crude instrument for allocating the 
stream of revenue stemming from the assets that Shougang operated. In the post-
contract system, the direct influence of state planners on Shougang has 
substantially declined. Shougang’s range of decision-making independence in 
respect to the purchase of inputs, its production structure and product marketing 
has increased substantially compared to the contract system, when the government 
still controlled many of the key decisions. Shougang is moving towards a new 
epoch, with the plans to float parts of the steel business on the stock market. It 
wishes to improve the value-added of output and per unit profits through 
increasing the production of high value-added products.  
The steel sector presents very different possibilities for catch-up among 
firms in LDCs. Firms in this sector are less able to establish competitive 
advantage through brand, technical progress in product or process, and systems 
integration and high investment in information systems. The process of 
globalisation of business systems is much less advanced than in other sectors, so 
that the TNCs are relatively less far advanced compared to those in LDCs. China 
possesses the advantage of already being the world’s largest producer of steel. Not 
only is the Chinese overall market fast-growing, but there is every prospect that it 
will continue to grow over the long-term, albeit with the usual cycles that 
characterise demand for steel in all economies. Moreover, Chinese demand is 
rapidly changing its structure towards high-quality steel as manufacturing output 
advances, consumer tastes change and Chinese manufactures increasingly 
penetrate world markets with the associated demands for high quality raw 
materials. 
                                                                                                                                      
enterprise”. Shougang’s mobilisatory, quasi-military and highly disciplined management style 
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China’s leading steel firms may well be able to compete at the low value-
added end of the market. However, the steel market is becoming increasingly 
segmented as the global industry began to enter a period of large-scale 
institutional and technical change. In the US, a new form of large steel firm based 
around mini-mills began to develop, of which Nucor is the leading example. A 
truly global steel company, Ispat, based in London, with a collection of steel 
plants across the world, rapidly came to prominence. Within Europe, a series of 
large-scale cross-border mergers transformed the industry. By the turn of the 
millennium, a small group of “European champions” had emerged in the industry, 
led by Arbed, Thyssen-Krupps, Usinor and Corus (the merger of British Steel and 
Hoogovens). Each of these firms had global reach, with plants across the world, 
and a high capability in specialist, high quality, high value-added steel. They were 
able to supply the global needs of large firms in such industries as packaging, 
automobiles, complex machinery, high quality construction, and white goods. The 
leading companies established very close ties with their customers in order to met 
their global needs for high quality steel. In the high value-added and high profit 
part of the industry, only Baogang can feel confident that it is able to directly 
compete with the emerging global giants of Europe and the established giants of 
Asia in Japan and Korea. Shougang, like other large traditional Chinese steel 
firms, will find it difficult to compete directly on the global level playing field in 
high quality steel. 
Nonetheless, the experience of catch-up of Posco and Nippon suggest that 
we cannot write Shougang and other large Chinese steel firms off yet. If Shougang 
is able successfully to divest itself of loss-making non-core businesses, raise 
capital on the stock market and slowly downsize employment in the core business, 
it should be able to generate the resources for continued upgrading of its steel 
technology and diversifying its product portfolio. If Shougang was able to develop 
into globally competitive, modern integrated steel companies, then there is every 
likelihood that it would become formidable international competitor for the 
established giants. 
                                                                                                                                      
under the contract system is a variant of the same East Asian tradition. 
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Figure 1: Shougang Group Corporate Structure, 1998
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Table 1: Distribution of Profits in Shougang Corporation, 1978-1997 
Total profits Handed over profits 
Retained 
profits 
State 
infrastructure 
tax† Year 
(in million yuan, % share in brackets) 
1978 300 (100%) 
294
(98.2%)
6
(1.8%)     0.8 
1979 369 (100%) 
336
(91.1%)
33
(8.9%)     4.9 
1980 444 (100%) 
382
(86.0%)
62
(14.0%)     9.3 
1981 445 (100%) 
380
(85.4%)
65
(14.6%)     9.7 
1982 527 (100%) 
408
(77.4%)
119
(22.6%)   17.9 
1983 633 (100%) 
438
(69.2%)
195
(30.8%)   29.3 
1984 778 (100%) 
469
(60.3%)
309
(39.7%)   46.3 
1985 934 (100%) 
504
(54.0%)
430
(46.0%)   64.6 
1986 1,121 (100%) 
540
(48.2%)
581
(51.8%)   87.2 
1987 1,345 (100%) 
579
(43.0%)
766
(57.0%) 115.0 
1988 1,615 (100%) 
620
(38.4%)
994
(61.5%) 149.1 
1989 1,893 (100%) 
665
(35.1%)
1,228
(64.9%) 184.1 
1990 2,092 (100%) 
713
(32.1%)
1,379
(65.9%) 207.2 
1991 2,361 (100%) 
964
(40.8%)
1,396
(59.1%) 194.2 
1992 3,202 (100%) 
830
(25.9%)
2,372
(74.1%) 323.9 
1993-
1997* 
23,101 
(100%) 
16,197
(70.1%)
6,904
(29.9%) N/A 
1979-
1997* 
40,903 
(100%) 
24,025
(58.7%)
16,878
(41.3%) N/A 
Notes:  
†: 15% of retained profits. 
*: These data were provided separately from the other information in the table. Data for 
1993-1997 are derived from the other information in the table. 
 
Sources: 1978-1992 annual data from Salomon Brothers, 1994:16; other data from interview. 
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Table 2: Structure of Principal Steel Products at Major Chinese Steel Plants, 
1997 
Major products: 
heavy 
rail 
large 
section 
medium 
section 
small 
section 
quality 
section 
wire 
rods 
Medium 
plate sheet strip 
seamless 
steel 
tubes 
Companies 
/ category 
of plants 
(in 10,000 tons, % share in total in brackets) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 116.9 415.5 49.5 56.4Baosteel 
(0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (9.8%) (31.8%) (9.5%) (15.6%) 
28.2 12.3 44.3 35.0 6.6 64.2 140.5 204.1 56.5 34.5Angang (29.3%) (9.4%) (10.4%) (1.4%) (1.1%) (3.3%) (11.7%) (15.6%) (10.9%) (9.6%) 
0.0 0.0 17.0 235.9 36.0 269.8 44.4 4.2 31.6 0.0Shougang (0.0%) (0.0%) (4.0%) (9.3%) (6.1%) (13.8%) (3.7%) (0.3%) (6.1%) (0.0%) 
3.6 37.7 9.8 2.0 7.6 40.4 148.9 208.5 3.8 0.3Wugang (3.7%) (28.9%) (2.3%) (0.1%) (1.3%) (2.1%) (12.5%) (15.9%) (0.7%) (0.1%) 
29.2 29.7 0.0 42.8 11.9 64.4 0.0 0.0 56.5 34.5Baotou (30.3%) (22.7%) (0.0%) (1.7%) (2.0%) (3.3%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (10.9%) (9.6%) 
0.0 0.7 42.0 24.2 0.0 86.7 36.6 0.0 15.2 0.0Magang (0.0%) (0.5%) (9.9%) (1.0%) (0.0%) (4.4%) (3.1%) (0.0%) (2.9%) (0.0%)
34.9 33.3 0.4 4.6 1.6 22.1 33.4 36.4 13.0 0.0Pangang (36.2%) (25.5%) (0.1%) (0.2%) (0.3%) (1.1%) (2.8%) (2.8%) (2.5%) (0.0%) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.1 0.0 21.1 176.7 0.0 0.0Bengang (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (3.3%) (0.0%) (1.8%) (13.5%) (0.0%) (0.0%) 
95.9 122.7 157.4 786.4 605.3 921.1 824.7 1,213.5 234.3 243.2Key 
plants (99.5%) (94.0%) (37.1%) (31.1%) (103.3%) (47.1%) (69.0%) (92.8%) (45.1%) (67.5%) 
0.4 7.6 179.5 1,131.5 188.3 884.0 396.4 50.3 125.4 64.7Local 
plants (0.4%) (5.8%) (42.3%) (44.7%) (32.1%) (45.2%) (33.1%) (3.8%) (24.1%) (17.9%) 
0.0 0.4 87.4 612.7 57.9 148.5 1.8 44.3 96.6 52.6non-system 
output (0.0%) (0.3%) (20.6%) (24.2%) (9.9%) (7.6%) (0.2%) (3.4%) (18.6%) (14.6%) 
96.4 130.6 424.2 2,530.6 585.7 1,953.6 1,195.9 1,308.1 519.8 360.5China: 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Compiled from CMISI, 1998: 8-9 & 42-44. 
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Table 3: Remuneration and Labour Productivity in Selected Countries and 
Plants, 1994-1998 
Countries / firms Year Number of steel workers 
Average weekly 
wage (in US$)* 
Labour 
productivity (in 
ton/man/year) 
Japan: 1998 221,000 1,197.9 423.1
Nippon Steel 1995 27,583 948.9
NKK 1995 17,692 614.8
Kawasaki 1995 13,384 753.5
South Korea: 1998 64,000 453.5 625.0
Posco 1994 22,891 966.1
Taiwan: 1996 22,878 304.6 528.9
China Steel 1995 9,239 666.9
Germany: 1998 80,000 732.0 558.8
Thyssen 1995 126,987 84.3
Krupp 1995 66,740 74.3
France: 1998 38,000 N/A 531.6
Usinor-Sacilor 1995 58,335  265.7
UK: 1998 33,000 N/A 524.0
British Steel 1995 40,000 335.0
US: 1998 160,000 770.78 610.6
USX 1995 20,845 529.3
Bethlehem Steel 1995 19,500 486.1
LTV 1994 15,300 489.3
China: 1997 3,768,860 109.45 28.91
Baosteel 1997 34,688 259.53 529.0
Angang 1997 180,519 106.56 51.0
Shougang 1997 218,153 105.58 70.0**
Wugang 1997 119,518 125.33 51.0
Baotou 1997 94,494 99.90 58.0
Magang 1997 46,218 120.23 64.0
Pangang 1997 95,707 114.32 35.0
Bengang 1997 91,541 113.45 38.0
Notes: 
*: For advanced countries, the wage rates were in 1995 data. For China, the wage rates were 
in 1996 data. 
**: Shougang’s internal document revealed that the labour productivity was 156 tons per man 
year (SG, 1998:7). This higher figure may EXCLUDE those workers not directly 
involved in steel production. 
 
Sources: Compiled from ISIC, 1997:122-123; CMISI, 1998: 276-280 & IISI, 1999. 
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